Contrôle de puissance distribué efficace énergétiquement et jeux répétés

Abstract : We consider a distributed wireless network represented by a multiple access channel including N mobile terminals and a fixe base station. Terminals choose themselves the way they control their power with the aim of maximizing the energy efficiency of their communications. This problem can be seen as a non-cooperative strategic game. The existing works allow to assert the existence and the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium of this game. Unfortunately, this equilibrium can be very ineffective (in the sense of Pareto or in the sense of the social welfare). In this study, we suggest improving the efficiency of the equilibrium of this game by taking into account the fact that the interaction between players is generally made on several slots. We take place in the context of the repeated games to spread the equilibrium condition on the time. For unpredictable duration and stochastic channels gains, we propose a sub-game perfect equilibrium strategy, which guarantees to the players Pareto-optimales utilities.
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https://hal-supelec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00407933
Contributor : Samir Medina Perlaza <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, July 28, 2009 - 12:34:21 AM
Last modification on : Thursday, April 5, 2018 - 12:30:04 PM
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Mael Le Treust, Samir M. Perlaza, Samson Lasaulce. Contrôle de puissance distribué efficace énergétiquement et jeux répétés. GRETSI-2009, Sep 2009, France. 4 p. ⟨hal-00407933⟩

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