Spectrum Sharing Games on the Interference Channel

Abstract : In this paper, we address the problem of spectrum sharing where competitive operators coexist in the same frequency band. First, we model this problem as a strategic non-cooperative game where operators simultaneously share the spectrum according to the Nash Equilibrium (N.E). Given a set of channel realizations, several Nash equilibria exist which renders the outcome of the game unpredictable. For this reason, the spectrum sharing problem is reformulated as a Stackelberg game where the first operator is already being deployed and the secondary operator follows next. The Stackelberg equilibrium (S.E) is reached where the best response of the secondary operator is taken into account upon maximizing the primary operator's utility function. Finally, we assess the goodness of the proposed distributed approach by comparing its performance to the centralized approach.
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Communication dans un congrès
IEEE International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, May 2009, Turkey. 8 p., 2009
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Soumis le : jeudi 14 janvier 2010 - 11:13:44
Dernière modification le : jeudi 5 avril 2018 - 12:30:04
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  • HAL Id : hal-00447056, version 1



Mehdi Bennis, Mael Le Treust, Samson Lasaulce, Merouane Debbah. Spectrum Sharing Games on the Interference Channel. IEEE International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, May 2009, Turkey. 8 p., 2009. 〈hal-00447056〉



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