A taint marking approach to confidentiality violation detection

Abstract : This article presents a novel approach to confidentiality violation detection based on taint marking. Information flows are dynamically tracked between applications and objects of the operating system such as files, processes and sockets. A confidentiality policy is defined by labelling sensitive information and defining which information may leave the local system through network exchanges. Furthermore, per application profiles can be defined to restrict the sets of information each application may access and/or send through the network. In previous works, we focused on the use of mandatory access control mechanisms for information flow tracking. In this current work, we have extended the previous information flow model to track network exchanges, and we are able to define a policy attached to network sockets. We show an example application of this extension in the context of a compromised web browser: our implementation detects a confidentiality violation when the browser attempts to leak private information to a remote host over the network.
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Conference papers
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https://hal-supelec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00736045
Contributor : Myriam Andrieux <>
Submitted on : Thursday, September 27, 2012 - 2:52:18 PM
Last modification on : Friday, November 16, 2018 - 1:37:58 AM

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  • HAL Id : hal-00736045, version 1

Citation

Christophe Hauser, Frédéric Tronel, Jason Reid, Colin Fidge. A taint marking approach to confidentiality violation detection. AISC 2012, Jan 2012, Melbourne, Australia. pp.83-90. ⟨hal-00736045⟩

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