Pricing mechanisms for cooperative state estimation

Abstract : The conflict between cooperation in distributed state estimation and the resulting leakage of private state information (competitive privacy) is studied for an interconnected two regional transmission organizations (RTOs) model of the grid. Using an information theoretic rate-distortion-leakage (RDL) tradeoff model, each RTO communicates at a rate chosen to optimize an objective function that is dependent on two opposing quantities: a rate-distortion based pricing function that encourages cooperation, and a leakage function that impedes it. It is shown that strictly non-zero pricing incentives are required to achieve non-trivial target distortions.
Document type :
Conference papers
Complete list of metadatas

Cited literature [4 references]  Display  Hide  Download

https://hal-supelec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00771239
Contributor : Ejder Bastug <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, January 8, 2013 - 11:37:56 AM
Last modification on : Thursday, September 27, 2018 - 10:50:03 AM
Long-term archiving on : Tuesday, April 9, 2013 - 3:51:55 AM

File

isccsp_vero_20oct2011.pdf
Files produced by the author(s)

Identifiers

Collections

Citation

Elena Veronica Belmega, L. Sankar, H. Vincent Poor, Mérouane Debbah. Pricing mechanisms for cooperative state estimation. ISCCSP 2012, May 2012, Rome, Italy. pp.1-4, ⟨10.1109/ISCCSP.2012.6217856⟩. ⟨hal-00771239⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

170

Files downloads

140