The Knowledge Account of Assertion and the Epistemic Version of Moore's Paradox

Franck Lihoreau (1)

1 LHSP - Laboratoire d'Histoire des Sciences et de Philosophie - Archives Henri Poincaré

Although they endorse slightly different versions of the
“knowledge account of assertion”, Williamson (2000) and DeRose (2002) both agree that it can help us deal with the “knowledge version of Moore's paradox”. My purpose in this paper is not to deny this. It is to argue that there is a better way to put the knowledge account of assertion to use to solve the paradox.

Mots clés: knowledge account of assertion; Moore's paradox; knowledge rule; contextualism

Mots clés: analyse de l'assertion en termes de connaissance; le paradoxe de Moore; la règle de connaissance; contextualisme

Domaines: Philosophie

Franck Lihoreau. The Knowledge Account of Assertion and the Epistemic Version of Moore's Paradox. 2006. ⟨halshs-00113478v1⟩